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Standing Watch: Protective Vigilance Against School Shootings 
 
Echoes of the name Sandy Hook have rippled across the nation, on the lips of 
parents and politicians, and within our schools, on the lips of teachers and principals. With 
the name reverberates plans to avoid the same breed of tragedy in each school, using 
preventative and combative measures against any school shooter. One of these measures, 
which has drawn possibly the most controversy, is training and arming teachers. Yet, this is 
the most basic defense against a shooter: the ability to shoot back. Obviously, responsible 
steps must be taken to ensure that unstable teachers and children do not have access to the 
firearm, and that it is not their only option of defense. However, it is the teacher’s 
responsibility to protect his or her students and, in the case of a school shooter, it is the 
most basic, direct, and effective way of thwarting the threat.  
To show it is the most basic, direct, and effective response, though, each other 
method must be considered, and then eventually compared to it. Therefore, first, let us 
consider what the threat is that we are preparing for, and compare and contrast that with the 
sparking incident to these reforms: Sandy Hook. We will do this by going step-by-step 
through what happened at Sandy Hook, alongside whatever response or lack thereof there 
may be in regard to each point. Then, we shall consider those methods which are in 
response, not to this particular shooting, but to the trend of school shootings in general. 
 The shooter shot through the locked door and entered the building (CNN, 2013). 
This is the very first point: entrance. The only responses of specific preventative measures 
on the entrance are metal detectors, and securing the entrance via visual identification from 
the office before being buzzed in. Neither of these prevents what happened at Sandy Hook. 
He had no desire to hide the fact that he was carrying, and the door being locked did 
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nothing to stop him.  
The only thing that might have slowed his entrance is bullet-proof glass, such as 
banks have, sometimes, to protect their tellers. For a school, it would make more sense at 
the entrance, since it is access to the school that is to be prevented, instead of behind the 
counter of a bank. However, even bulletproof glass has its limits. According to CNN, the 
weapon he used to shoot out the door was an AR-15 (CNN, 2013). An AR-15 can get 
through Level 7 bullet-resistant material in 6 shots (AmmoForSale.com, 2013; UL 752), and 
some of the best see-through bullet-resistant doors are Level 3, at the highest (Pacific 
Bulletproof Co., 2013). To slow him down properly, the door would have had to be Level 8 
or higher (UL 752).  
What the metal detectors do accomplish is to help expose anyone trying to conceal a 
gun coming into the school. Although it is possible visitors would be caught by this, this 
mainly targets students. That is, it targets detection of weapons being carried into the school 
by students. The students themselves show little evidence of being deterred from violence by 
the presence of metal detectors (Hankin, Hertz, & Simon, 2011, p.100). 
What occurred next, after the shooter shot through the door and entered, was that 
three faculty members moved toward the noise to investigate (CNN, 2013). It is possible 
they were not sure what the noise was, exactly. In the article, it is described as “loud pops” 
(CNN, 2013). Certainly, one does not expect to hear gunshots and breaking glass at the 
beginning of a school-day. There is not a particular response that can even be suggested to 
address this. One cannot expect faculty to arm themselves before checking out a noise. The 
only potential suggestion one might make is for the sound of various types of gunfire to be 
included in training, as it tends to be misrepresented in Hollywood productions, so that 
faculty will be able to identify the noise and respond in a way that does not put them 
immediately and directly in jeopardy.  
Teachers, hearing and recognizing the gunfire as such, now, moved students into the 
bathrooms and closets to hide them (CNN, 2013). Although this is not in the article, part of 
the reason the response to Sandy Hook has been to have students throw things at the 
invader and not just hide, is that when a teacher was shot in at least one of the classrooms, 
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the students panicked and flooded out of their hiding places. (CT) Some of my peers 
expressed that such was a stupid move, but, for one, when someone is actually in a situation 
it can be difficult to think clearly and, for another, one has to remember that he headed 
directly for the early grades (CNN, 2013). Kindergarteners and first-graders (CNN, 2013) 
cannot be expected to make adult decisions in emergency situations.  
Much like airplane hijacking used to be dealt with by passive cooperation previous to 
9/11, the strategy of depending solely on hiding is passing away with Sandy Hook, in favor 
of more active methods, mainly involving pelting invaders with anything and everything at 
hand, and evacuating, if possible. Both methods makes sense, as the assailant would be too 
busy defending himself to shoot, and evacuating the school would prevent students from 
being ‘sitting ducks’. Both are also just a small part of the main spearhead of more active 
defense: ALICE training. That is not to say that all the training is created equally or is the 
same across the board, but it at least formulates a school-wide response that includes actively 
combating or avoiding the shooter, rather than grouping up in a corner to be shot.  
In the interim between teacher response to initial gunshots, and the arrival of the 
police, the majority of the shooting took place. However, this interim will be discussed later 
when more specifically addressing arming teachers. Here, instead, we shall skip down to how 
long it took before first responders arrived: 20 minutes (CNN, 2013). Though there will be 
more elaboration on this point later, regarding the function of first responders, for now 
suffice it to say that one good suggestion has been made regarding contacting police 
promptly. That is, it has been suggested that teachers and faculty have a button at their desks 
and in the teachers’ lounge that directly calls out the police, much like tellers use for bank 
robberies. This would ensure the police are contacted as promptly as possible, so that they 
can respond as promptly as possible. Of course, the button should probably be under the 
desk, or in a drawer or cabinet at the desk, to help avoid students causing false alarms. Now, 
this would not have helped the 20-minute gap, as this gap began with the first calls to the 
police (CNN, 2013), so it is purely response-time. However, especially in such cases where a 
long gap exists, the sooner the police can be reached, the better. 
 The downside to this alarm system, though, is that it depends on teachers and faculty 
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being there to press it. Unlike tellers, who are protecting cash and only have to stand behind 
a counter, teachers are on the move, and have their students to protect and move to safety. 
Obviously, they do not have to press their own button, and it would be a benefit for all the 
faculty and teachers to know exactly where all the buttons are, but, it is not necessarily 
possible for a teacher to just run over to the nearest button to press it. Yet, even with this 
taken consideration, often someone is available to press it. Even with suppressors (the true 
purpose of which is not to disguise the sound but confuse the location of the shooter in a 
crowd outdoors), at least one teacher should be able to hear and identify the sound of 
gunshots, go to the nearest button, and use it to alert police. 
The remainder of what occurred is after-the fact. The shooter shot himself before he 
could be captured, the police gathered survivors to a local firehouse, getting them out of and 
away from the school, and the parents came out to the firehouse (CNN, 2013). From 
beginning to end, 28 people were murdered: 20 children ages 6-7, 6 adults at the school, the 
shooter’s mother, whom he murdered right before attacking the school, and, lastly, the 
shooter himself, when he took his own life (CNN, 2013).  
Going over it step-by-step, we have addressed: metal detectors, visual identification 
for entry, both regarding the point of entrance; identification/recognition of gunfire as 
noteworthy for inclusion within training, for aiding a safe response to gunfire; the switch-
over from passive to active defense, as passive did not prove effective within the real-world 
scenario;  and an alarm system for contacting the police promptly.  
 Now that we have gone over responses relevant, effective or otherwise, to Sandy 
Hook, let us now go over the overall response. Of note, there is one particular method that I 
will choose specifically to not take seriously, due to, frankly, how ridiculous it is, and that is 
bulletproof backpacks. It strikes about as feasible as combat helmets in the grocery store, if 
not less so. Aside from the expense, it would add weight to current concerns about already 
too-heavy backpacks, and be essentially useless, as backpacks spend most of their time in the 
lockers, and not on the children, except possibly for on the bus. Other than that, though, 
here we will go over the remaining methods and plans put out there in response to school 
shootings, and the implications or interconnecting issues involved with that overall response.  
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The three remaining methods having to do with the overall response are: Obama’s 
Plan, security guards, and arming teachers and janitors. Since it has the most to do with an 
overall response, due to being a politically-sponsored national plan, we will first address 
Obama’s Plan. 
One of the first claims it makes is that each district can choose according to its 
customary needs (Strauss, 2013). The reason for my use of the word “claim” is that it does 
not follow up with specific points how it will ensure this customization ability, and later on 
refers to the Department of Education filtering through suggestions and implementing the 
ones it chooses (Strauss, 2013). It will do this not only for security, but also for discipline 
systems, in order to improve the internal environment of the school as a preventative 
measure (Strauss, 2013). There will also be additional required programs, such as for training 
teachers to detect mental illness in students and refer them to treatment (Strauss, 2013). 
Another reason for my use of the word “claim” is because, with government funding 
and programs, comes the bureaucracy, regulations, and restrictions that choke the life out of 
local customization rendering it, if not impossible, not feasible due to being too busy 
fulfilling federal demands. Essentially, when the federal government takes over something 
there is very little room for local creativity. This plan, too, is full of funding and programs. 
Its answer to school shootings seems to be to throw money at the problem.  
The plan calls for: up to 1,000 school resource officers and counselors, training for 
more than 5,000 mental health professionals, favored selection of grants for any local law 
enforcement that hires school resource officers, funding for safety equipment, millions of 
dollars towards training teachers to spot mental illness, millions towards helping the school 
get the students treatment, millions again for grants and funding for improving the internal 
climate of schools, and the resources it takes to develop a massive PR drive that attacks the 
stigmas associated with mental illness (Strauss, 2013). That is not to say that none of these 
are good ideas; more school counselors and a PR drive to battle stigmas sounds excellent, in 
fact.  
The problem is it puts an even greater burden of responsibility on the schools. In 
return for receiving this funding, schools are held responsible to develop emergency plans to 
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whatever standard the government chooses to set, and to give an accounting that 
demonstrates the money is going to good use (Strauss, 2013). That part does not seem 
horrible, but there is more. The schools will be held responsible to implement strategies the 
government believes will improve the behavior of students (Strauss, 2013). This point in the 
plan makes the claim of custom plans for the school, by the school, a moot point, even if 
they try to implement it. If the government can tell them what their discipline plan will be, 
based on what the Department of Education deems to be a good idea, much less what 
security is needed, that is not providing an ability for the schools to fulfill their own needs 
according to their own plan.  
In short, the response of the government via Obama’s Plan, to the school shootings, 
is to throw resources at the schools and excise even more control over them. However, not 
all their ideas are bad. They specifically target mental illness and trauma, for example, which 
is a rising issue in this country, and one connected the original incident due to the shooter’s 
trauma from being previously bullied at Sandy Hook (Stanglin, 2013).  
Now, finally, we are to the main point. We have gone over various methods, some 
ineffective, and some potentially capable of slowing down and putting a shooter on the 
defense. The methods we now reach are those which have the potential to take a shooter 
down. Part of the controversy over armed resistance within the school is the belief that this 
is the police’s job, and that we can trust someone sent through an academy and put on the 
streets to daily face armed assailants more than teachers or janitors, or even security guards, 
who would only be going through training at their individual schools to fight off an invader. 
Whether a policeman or an employee of the school, either one would have to take 
psychological exams to ensure they could be trusted with a weapon, both would receive 
appropriate training, but one, minutes away, is trusted more than the one already there.  
First responders, though, are just that: responders. They show up to cut short 
problems, and clean up afterwards. They cannot be there to guard and protect the students. 
First responders minimize casualties, not prevent them. The possibility of security guards, or 
armed janitors, too, is one of interest. Their presence at the school helps, but it is essentially 
the same as the police, just a shorter commute, upstairs, downstairs, or whatever. They are 
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not necessarily there when the first shots are fired, and are not in control of who is firing 
those shots. 
The ones who are, are the teachers. Of course, no method suggested is without its 
share of responsibility. The responsibility, though, does not fall on the school as an entity 
itself, though it should when it can, but on those who are there. It is the responsibility of 
each adult in that building, that if they run into a shooter in the building, they do what they 
can to stop him or her from wounding, and possibly killing, the children in that school. 
Shooters, though, have not been heading for the offices, but the classrooms. Teachers need 
to be ready. 
 Now, it is dangerous to hand a gun to a teacher who is uncomfortable with it 
(someone who is nervous with a weapon often grows clumsy with it), and there is no request 
to give a teacher a gun without knowing if they are mentally stable, first. The gun also should 
be stowed properly, in a locked safe, in a locked drawer. Yes, that does take time to unlock 
both, but it still takes less time than a security guard coming from the other side of the 
school building (security guards are expensive, so there is some doubt as to most schools 
having more than one, something not even funded by Obama’s Plan,) or a police officer 
driving there from the department. Also, the deterrent to a shooter of simply knowing that if 
he walks into that school building with a gun, and shoots or threatens to shoot someone, 
that bullets may come flying his direction from any number of armed teachers, and their 
combined firepower, is a powerful deterrent indeed.  
One point that was skipped earlier was the part during which the shooter slayed 
twenty children, and four more adults, in addition to the two women he killed when he first 
came in (CNN, 2013). During that time police were driving there, teachers were hiding the 
children, and he was going through the kindergarten and first-grade classrooms (CNN, 
2013). Regardless of whatever methods could have been employed to slow him down, at this 
point, he was there, shooting, and there was no one able to shoot back. 
Metal detectors and visual identification could not have slowed him down. 
Recognition of gunfire and pressing an alarm button theoretically could have alerted police 
sooner, but could not have shortened that twenty minutes. The switch-over from passive to 
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active defense might have cut short his attack, if they could have kept him down and 
restrained, or avoided him, but again, it is uncertain. Additional counselors and school 
resource officers might have been able to help him when he was bullied, and potentially 
prevented this shooting, but we cannot know that. He was quiet, autistic, and sensitive to 
touch (Stanglin, 2013). It cannot be said with certainty a counselor would have changed the 
outcome, or that an additional school resource officer would have stopped the bullying. 
There is also considerable doubt, whatever the government’s plans might change in the 
internal environment of schools, that they will eliminate bullying, especially since laws have 
shown little effectiveness in this regard, thus far (Kueny & Zirkel, 2012) and more research 
is needed to decrease it, much less eliminate it (Blosnich & Bossarte, 2011).  
No other method provides the absolute, direct response, and effective end to the 
threat in a school shooting the way arming a trained teacher does. It only makes sense to 
fight firearm with firearm, and to arm the hands of the one who is often both the target, and 
in a protective role over targeted students. Waiting on police or depending on other methods 
alone, is unreliable. 
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